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ABSTRACT
Voice Assistants (VA) such as Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant
are quickly and seamlessly integrating into people’s daily lives.
The increased reliance on VA services raises privacy concerns such
as the leakage of private conversations and sensitive information.
Privacy policies play an important role in addressing users’ privacy
concerns and informing them about the data collection, storage, and
sharing practices. VA platforms (both Amazon Alexa and Google
Assistant) allow third-party developers to build new voice-apps and
publish them to the app store. Voice-app developers are required
to provide privacy policies to disclose their apps’ data practices.
However, little is known whether these privacy policies are infor-
mative and trustworthy or not on emerging VA platforms. On the
other hand, many users invoke voice-apps through voice and thus
there exists a usability challenge for users to access these privacy
policies.
In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale data analytics to
systematically measure the effectiveness of privacy policies pro-
vided by voice-app developers on twomainstreamVA platforms.We
seek to understand the quality and usability issues of privacy poli-
cies provided by developers in the current app stores. We analyzed
64,720 Amazon Alexa skills and 2,201 Google Assistant actions. Our
work also includes a user study to understand users’ perspectives
on VA’s privacy policies. Our findings reveal a worrisome reality of
privacy policies in two mainstream voice-app stores, where there
exists a substantial number of problematic privacy policies. Surpris-
ingly, Google and Amazon even have official voice-apps violating
their own requirements regarding the privacy policy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Virtual Assistants (VA) such as Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant
have been seamlessly integrated into our daily life. An estimated
3.25 billion digital voice assistants are being used around the world
in 2019. The number is forecasted to reach 8 billion users by 2023
which is higher than the current world population [9]. VA handles
a wide range of queries that humans are posing, e.g., from ordering
everyday items, managing bank accounts, controlling smart home
devices to recommending clothing stores and new fashions. Despite
the many convenient features, there is an increasing concern on
privacy risks of VA users [16, 19, 23, 26, 31, 32, 35, 37].
Privacy and data protection laws are in place in most of the
countries around the world to protect end users online. These com-
pliance requirements aremostly satisfied by providing a transparent
privacy policy by developers. Google was fined €50 million by a
French data protection regulator after its privacy policy failed to
comply with General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR). This
fine was not for failing to provide a privacy policy but for not
having a one that was good enough and failing to provide enough
information to users [6]. Researchers have shown that there are
many discrepancies between mobile apps (e.g., Android apps) and
their privacy policies [17, 36, 39, 47], which may be either because
of careless preparation by benign developers or an intentional de-
ception by malicious developers [41]. Such inconsistencies could
lead to public enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) or other regulatory agencies [48]. For example, FTC
fined $800,000 against Path (a mobile app operator) because of an
incomplete data practice disclosure in its privacy policy [13]. In
another case, Snapchat transmitted geolocation information from
users of its Android app, despite the privacy policy states that it
did not track such information. In 2014, FTC launched a formal
investigation requesting Snapchat to implement a comprehensive
privacy program [14].
VA platforms allow third-party developers to build new voice-
apps (which are called skills on Amazon platform and actions on
Google platform, respectively) and publish them to app stores. In
order to comply with privacy regulations (such as COPPA [18])
and protect consumers’ privacy, voice-app developers are required
to provide privacy policies and notify users of their apps’ data
practices. Typically, a proper privacy policy is a document that
should have answers to aminimum of three important questions [7]:
1) What information is being collected? 2) How this information
is being used? and 3) What information is being shared? Third-
party skills and actions are in very high number in the respective
stores. Developers are required to provide privacy policies for their
voice-apps. Policies could be diverse and poorly written, which
results in more users ignoring the privacy policy and choosing to
not read it. This also leads to users using a privacy-sensitive service
without having a proper understanding of the data that is being
collected from them and what the developer will do with it. On the
other hand, the feature that makes VA devices like Amazon Echo
and Google Assistant interesting is the ability to control them over
the voice without the need of physically accessing them. Despite
the convenience, it poses challenges on effective privacy notices
to enable users to make informed privacy decisions. The privacy
policy may be missing completely in the conversational interface
unless users read it over the smartphone app or through the web.
In this work, we mainly investigate the following three research
questions (RQs):
• RQ1: What is the overall quality of privacy policies pro-
vided by voice-app developers in different VA platforms?
Do they provide informative and meaningful privacy poli-
cies as required by VA platforms?
• RQ2: For a seemingly well-written privacy policy that con-
tains vital information regarding the service provided to
users, can we trust it or not? Can we detect inconsistent
privacy policies of voice-apps?
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• RQ3: What are VA users’ perspectives on privacy policies
of voice-apps? What is possibly a better usability choice
for VA users to make informed privacy decisions?
We conduct the first empirical analysis to measure the effective-
ness of privacy policies provided by voice-app developers on both
Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant platforms. Such an effort has
not previously been reported. The major contributions and findings
are summarized as follow1.
• We analyze 64,720 Amazon Alexa skills and 2,201 Google
Assistant actions. We first check whether they have a pri-
vacy policy. For the 17,952 skills and 1,967 actions that have
one, unfortunately, we find there are many voice-apps in
app stores with incorrect privacy policy URLs or broken
links. Surprisingly, Google and Amazon even have official
voice-apps violating their own requirements regarding the
privacy policy.
• We further analyze the privacy policy content to identify
potential inconsistencies between policies and voice-apps.
We develop a Natural Language Processing (NLP)-based
approach to capture data practices from privacy policies.
We then compare the data practices of a privacy policy
against the app’s description. We find there are privacy
policies that are inconsistent with the corresponding skill
descriptions. We also find skills which are supposed to
have a privacy policy but do not provide one.
• We conduct a user study with 91 participants to under-
stand users’ perspectives on VA’s privacy policies, using
the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform. We
also discuss solutions to improve the usability of privacy
notices to VA users.
2 BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
2.1 Voice-app and privacy policy
Voice-app listing on the store. We mainly focus on two main-
stream VA platforms, i.e., Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant,
both with conceptually similar architectures. These platforms allow
third-party developers to publish their own voice-apps on VA stores.
A voice-app’s introduction page that is shared by the developer on
the store contains the app name, a detailed description, the cate-
gory it belongs to, developer information, user rating and reviews,
privacy policy link, and example voice commands which can be
viewed by end users. The source code is not included in the submis-
sion and therefore is not available either to the certification teams
of VA platforms or to end users. Users who enable a skill/action
through the voice-app store may make their decisions based on
the description. It explains the functionality and behavior of the
voice-app and what the user can expect from it. Some developers
also mention the data that is required from users (i.e., data practices)
in the description.
VA platform’s requirements on privacy policy. Application
developers are often required to provide a privacy policy and notify
users of their apps’ privacy practices. VA platforms have different
1Accompanying materials of this work including the dataset, empirical evidences
for inconsistent privacy policies, and tools are available at https://github.com/voice-
assistant-research/voice-assistant.
requirements regarding the privacy policies of voice-apps. Google
Assistant requires every action to have a privacy policy provided on
submission. Amazon Alexa requires skills that collect personal in-
formation only to mandatorily have a privacy policy. Both Amazon
and Google prevent the submission of a voice-app for certification if
their respective requirements are not met [1, 10]. In addition to the
privacy policy URL, both platforms offer an option for developers to
provide a URL for the terms of use as well. These URLs, if provided
by the developers, are made available along with the voice-app’s
listing on the store.
Requirements on specific content in privacy policies.Google
has a "Privacy Policy Guidance" page [7] in their documentation
for action developers. The guide explains what Google’s minimum
expectation is for a privacy policy document. According to the
guide, the privacy disclosures included in the policy should be com-
prehensive, accurate and easy to understand for the users. The
privacy policy should disclose all the information that an action
collects through all the interfaces including the data that is col-
lected automatically. How the collected information is used and
who and when the collected information is shared with should be
specified. Google rejects an action if developers do not provide (or
even misspell) the action name, company name, or developer email
in the privacy policy. The link should be valid and should also be
a public document viewable by everyone. Amazon Alexa doesn’t
provide a guideline for the privacy policy content in their Alexa
documentation.
Voice-app enablement. VA users enable official (i.e., developed
by VA platforms) or third-party voice-apps to expand the function-
ality of their devices. Voice-apps can be enabled by saying a simple
command through voice or by adding it from the smartphone app.
A voice-app for which the developer has requested permission
to access user’s data sends a permission request to the user’s VA
companion app on smartphone during enablement. The other voice-
apps are directly enabled. A privacy policy can be accessed either
over the VA companion app or through the web. On the contrary,
it is not accessible through the VA devices over voice. VA platforms
do not require end users to accept a privacy policy or the terms of
use of a voice-app before enabling it on their devices. It is left for
the users to decide whether to go through the privacy policy of the
voice-app they use or not.
2.2 Challenges on privacy policy analysis
Existing privacy policy analysis on smartphone platforms [17, 36,
39, 41, 47, 48] typically conduct static code analysis to analyze
potential inconsistencies between an app’s privacy policy and its
runtime behavior. Unlike smartphone app platforms, the source
code of voice-apps in Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant plat-
forms are not publicly available. A voice-app is hosted in a server
selected by its developer and only the developer has access to it.
As far as we know, the source code is not available even to the
VA platform’s certification teams. This limits the extent of our pri-
vacy analysis since we neither have a ground truth to validate our
findings of inconsistent privacy policies nor the actual code to find
more inconsistencies with the privacy policies provided. The only
useful information that we have about a voice-app is the descrip-
tion that is provided by the developer. Descriptions do not have
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Figure 1: Processing pipeline of our privacy policy analysis.
a minimum character count and developers can add a single line
description or a longer description explaining all functionalities and
other relevant information. Regardless, due to the unavailability of
other options, we use the voice-app descriptions for our analysis
to detect problematic privacy policies. For this reason, our results
on the inconsistency checking of privacy policies (in Section 3.3)
are not focused on the exact number of mismatches and errors but
on the existence of problems potentially affecting the overall user
experience.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present an overview of our approach, and
then detail the major modules including data collection process (Sec-
tion 3.1), capturing data practices based on NLP analysis (Sec-
tion 3.2), and inconsistency checking (Section 3.3). We seek to
understand whether developers provide informative and meaning-
ful privacy policies as required by VA platforms. Fig. 1 illustrates
the processing pipeline of our privacy policy analysis. As previously
mentioned, each skill/action’s listing page on the store contains
a description and a privacy policy link (URL). We first collect all
these webpages, and pre-process them to identify high-level issues
such as broken URLs and duplicate URLs. Then, we conduct an NLP
based analysis to capture data practices provided in privacy policies
and descriptions. We seek to identify three types of problematic
privacy policies: i) without any data practice; ii) incomplete policies
(e.g., a skill’s privacy policy lacks data collection information but
it has been mentioned in the skill’s description); and iii) missing
policies (e.g., a skill without a privacy policy but requires one due
to its data collection practices).
3.1 Data collection
We built a crawler to collect a voice-app’s id, name, developer infor-
mation, description and privacy policy link from Amazon Alexa’s
skills store and Google Assistant’s actions store. There were several
challenges for crawling introduction pages of voice-apps. First, for
the skills store, 23 categories of skills are listed but these are not
mutually exclusive. The category "communication" is a subcate-
gory in the "social" category and the category "home services" is
a subcategory in the "lifestyle" category. Some skills are classified
and listed in multiple categories. We need to remove duplicates
during the data collection. Second, Alexa’s skills store only pro-
vides up to 400 pages per category, and each page contains 16 skills.
Though Amazon Alexa claimed there are over 100,000 skills on
its skills store, we were able to crawl only 64,720 unique skills.
Third, Google actions store lists actions in pages that dynamically
load more actions when users reach the end of the page. We were
unable to use the crawler to automatically get information about
all the actions. As a result, we crawled 2,201 actions belonging to
18 categories from the Google actions store. The total numbers of
skills and actions by category we collected are listed in Table 9 and
Table 10 in Appendix.
Another challenge was to obtain the privacy policy content.
Given the privacy policy links, we observed that there are five
types of policy pages: i) normal html pages; ii) pdf pages; iii) Google
doc and Google drive documents; iv) txt files; and v) other types
of files (e.g., doc, docx or rtf). For normal html pages, we used the
webdriver [12] tool to collect the webpage content when they are
opened. For the other types of pages, we downloaded these files
and then extracted the content from them. Finally, we converted
all the privacy policies in different formats to the txt format.
PrivacyPolicyDataset.We collected 64,720 unique skills under
21 categories from Alexa’s skills store and 17,952 of these skills
provide privacy policy links. Among the 2,201 Google actions we
collected, 1,967 have privacy policy links.
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Figure 2: Length of a privacy policy.
For each skill/action with a valid policy link, we calculated the
number of words in the document. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative
distribution function of the privacy policy length. The average
length is 2,336 words for Alexa skills and 1,479 words for Google
actions, respectively. We also observed many very short privacy
policies which are not informative. An example is the Google action
"Mister Baavlo" which says "We do not store any of your data" but
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does not mention what data it collects. Examples of short privacy
policies are listed in Table 1.
Voice-app name Skill/Action Privacy policy
Passive income tips Skill "This is just a sample privacy policy link, You can usethis url, If you do not have it."
Activity Book Skill "This skill does not collect or save any personalinformation."
BestDateCalendar Skill It directs to Google home page
Story Time Skill (Kids) " No information is collected during the use of StoryTime"
KidsBrushYourTeethSong Skill (Kids) "Privacy Policy" (no content)
Mister baavlo Action "We do not store any of your data"
Sanskrit names for yoga
poses Action
"Google Docs: You need permission to access this
published document."
Table 1: Examples of short privacy policies.
Description Dataset. Description of a voice-app is intended to
introduce the voice-app to end users with information regarding its
functionality and other relevant information. It may also contain
data practices (e.g., the data required to be collected to achieve a
functionality) of the voice-app. We collected voice-app descriptions
and used them as baselines to detect potentially inconsistent privacy
policies. In our dataset, all skills/actions come with descriptions.
3.2 Capturing data practices
In order to automatically capture data practices in privacy policies
and descriptions of voice-apps, we develop a keyword-based ap-
proach using NLP. However, we want to emphasize that we do not
claim to resolve challenges for comprehensively extracting data
practices (i.e., data collection, sharing, and storing) from natural
language policies. Instead, we mainly focus on obtaining empiri-
cal evidences of problematic privacy policies using a simple and
accurate (i.e., in terms of the true positive) approach. We discuss
the limitation of our approach in Section 6.
Verb set related to data practices. Researchers in [20, 41] have
summarized four types of verbs commonly used in privacy policies:
Collect, Use, Retain and Disclose. Each type contains seman-
tically similar verbs in terms of the functionality. Collect means
an app would collect, gather, or acquire data from user; Use indi-
cates an app would use or process data; Retain means storing or
remembering user data; and Disclose means an app would share
or transfer data to another party.
Verb
Set
Access, Ask, Assign, Collect, Create, Enter, Gather, Import, Obtain,
Observe, Organize, Provide, Receive, Request, Share, Use, Include,
Integrate, Monitor, Process, See, Utilize, Retain, Cache, Delete, Erase,
Keep, Remove, Store, Transfer, Communicate, Disclose, Reveal, Sell,
Send, Update, View, Need, Require, Save
Noun
Set
Address, Name, Email, Phone, Birthday, Age, Gender, Location, Data,
Contact, Phonebook, SMS, Call, Profession, Income, Information
Table 2: Keyword dictionary related to data practices.
Noun set related to data practices. From Amazon’s skill per-
mission list [5] and Amazon Developer Services Agreement [3], we
manually collected a dictionary of 16 nouns related to data practices.
Table 2 lists a dictionary with 40 verbs and 16 nouns that we used
in our privacy policy analysis.
Phrases extraction.We first parsed a privacy policy into sen-
tences. We used the SpaCy library [8] to analyze each sentence, and
obtained the attribute for each word. SpaCy can effectively find the
straight correlation between a noun and a verb and ignore other
words in a sentence. We identified three types of basic phrases:
• noun (subject) + verb, e.g., "Alexa (will) tell" or "email (is)
required"
• verb + noun (object), e.g., "send (a) message"
• verb + noun (object) + noun + noun, e.g., "tell (you) (the)
name (of) meeting (on) (your) calendar"
Next, we combined two basic phrases to generate a longer phrase
if they share the same verb. The combined phrase would follow
patterns: "subject+verb+object" or "subject+is+passive verb". For ex-
ample, for a sentence "Alexa skill will quickly tell you the name and
time of the next meeting on your Outlook calendar", we obtained
the phrase "Alex tell name, meeting, calendar".
Identifying data practices. Given all phrases extracted from
the privacy policy and description, we used the verb and noun
sets in Table 2 to identify data practice phrases. Specifically, we
compared the similarity of verb and noun in each phrase with the
verb and noun sets respectively. If the similarity is higher than
a threshold, we consider the phrase as a data practice phrase. To
measure the semantic similarity of two phrases, we used the simi-
larity measurement based on word2vec provided by SpaCy, which
is determined by comparing two word vectors. We set the similarity
threshold to 0.8 in our analysis, so as to achieve a high true positive
rate (but no guarantee of the false negative rate). For example, our
tool identified privacy policies of 1,117 skills in Amazon Alexa and
95 actions in Google Assistant having zero data practice (details
are in Sec. 4.2.2). Our manual analysis confirmed that these privacy
policies do contain no data practice.
3.3 Inconsistency checking
With description phrases and privacy policy phrases for each voice-
app, we checked any potential inconsistency between them. First,
if the data practice phrases in a description are not semantically
similar to any data practice phrase in the corresponding privacy pol-
icy, we consider this privacy policy to be incomplete. For example,
the description of skill "Thought Leaders" mentions "Permission
required: Customer’s Full name, Customer’s Email Address, Cus-
tomer’s Phone number", but none of them are mentioned in its
privacy policy. We consider it an incomplete privacy policy.
Second, since Amazon Alexa only requires skills that collect per-
sonal information to provide a privacy policy, we detected whether
a privacy policy of an Alexa skill is missing although it is required.
If the description mentions that a skill collects some data but the
skill has no privacy policy, we consider that the skill lacks a privacy
policy. For example, a skill "Heritage Flag Color" mentions "The
device location is required" in its description. But the developer
doesn’t provide a privacy policy. Note that it only reflects an incon-
sistency between the privacy policy and description since there is a
lack of the ground truth to validate whether the skill really collects
the location information or not.
4 MAJOR FINDINGS
In this section, we discuss major findings from our analysis of the
privacy policies available in the stores of both Amazon Alexa and
Google Assistant. We first present high-level issues such as broken
and incorrect privacy policy URLs, duplicate privacy policy links,
and issues in Google and Amazon’s official voice-apps. Then, we
conduct a content analysis of privacy policies, and discuss the issues
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such as zero data practice and inconsistency in privacy policies. In
addition, we discuss usability issues of privacy policies for voice-
apps. We back our findings with representative examples that we
found from the app stores during our analysis.
4.1 High-level issues
Amazon skills Google actions
Total # Percentage Total # Percentage
Without privacy policy 46,768 72% 234 11%
Valid privacy policy URL 16,197 25% 1,887 85%
Broken privacy policy URL 1,755 3% 80 4%
Table 3: Statistics of privacy policies on two VA platforms.
4.1.1 Not all voice-apps have a privacy policy URL. Both Google
and Amazon have taken different approaches when it comes to the
requirement of a privacy policy for each voice-app available to users.
While Google has made it mandatory for developers to provide a
privacy policy along with each action, Amazon is more lenient
and makes it a requirement only for skills that declare that they
collect personal information through the skill. On analyzing the
stores, we have noticed irregularities concerning this, as illustrated
in Table 3. Out of the 2,201 actions we collected from the Google
action directory, only 1,967 have privacy policies provided which
means that 11% of the actions do not have a privacy policy provided.
While it is not possible to submit an action for certification without
including a privacy policy URL, it is puzzling how these actions are
available in the storewithout providing one. Out of these 234 actions
that do not have privacy policies, 101 actions were developed by
Google while the other 133 actions were developed by 41 other
developers.
In the case of Alexa skills, as shown in Table 3, only 17,952 (28%)
skills have a privacy policy out of the 64,720 skills we collected
(i.e., 46,768 skills without a privacy policy). It is partially because
of the lenient skill certification in Alexa. After conducting further
experiments on the skill certification, we have understood that even
if a skill collects personal information, the developer can choose
to not declare it during the certification stage and bypass the pri-
vacy policy requirement. This is achieved by collecting personal
information through the conversational interface (e.g., asking users’
names). Even though this data collection is prohibited, the certifica-
tion system of Amazon Alexa doesn’t reject such skills. As a result,
developers may choose to not provide a privacy policy. Amazon
only requires skills that collect personal data to provide a privacy
policy, and thus not all these 46,768 skills require a privacy policy. In
Sec. 4.2.4, we identify skills that potentially lack a required privacy
policy.
4.1.2 Broken links and incorrect URLs. For those actions and
skills that have provided a privacy policy URL, not every URL leads
to the page containing a privacy policy. Through our experiments,
we found 80 Google actions and 1,755 Alexa skills that have pro-
vided broken privacy policy URLs, as shown in Table 3. There are
also URLs which lead to other developer’s privacy policies. An
example for this is the skill "NORAD Tracks Santa" by NORAD
which provides a privacy policy URL that links to Amazon’s privacy
Figure 3: Landing page of the privacy policy URL provided
with the Google action and Alexa skill developed by Ru-
betek.
policy page instead of a privacy policy written by the developer.
The privacy policy URL of "Rubetek SmartHome" which is both an
Alexa skill and a Google action leads to the company’s homepage
which promotes its products, as shown in Fig. 3, rather than linking
to the privacy policy page. Sec. 4.2 presents our content analysis of
privacy policies, which provides more details about the voice-apps
with incorrect privacy policy URLs.
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Figure 4: Duplicate privacy policy URLs in two platforms.
4.1.3 Duplicate URLs. We found a substantial portion of privacy
policies share same URLs. In particular, Amazon Alexa has more
than 56% of skills with duplicate privacy policy URLs. Fig. 4 shows
the prevalence of duplicate privacy policy URLs in both platforms.
Out of the 17,952 Amazon skills with privacy policies, 7,828 skills
have a unique privacy policy URL. The other 10,124 skills (56.4%)
share 1,206 different privacy policy URLs. Out of these, 1,783 skills
(9.9%) have provided the same link (https://getstoryline.com/public/
privacy.html) as their privacy policy URLs. Note that these 1,783
skills are not from the same developer which indicates that the
privacy policy is irrelevant to these skills. Table 4 lists the most
common privacy policy URLs in Alexa and Google platforms. The
issue of duplicate URLs is more serious on Amazon Alexa platform.
The top three duplicate URLs are shared by 3,205 skills, constituting
17.8% of the total skills that have a privacy policy. As shown in
Fig. 4, the Google Assistant platform has 12.2% of actions with
duplicate privacy policy URLs. 1,728 out of 1,967 actions have a
unique privacy policy. The other 239 actions share 64 different
privacy policy URLs.
5
Platform Duplicate privacy policy URLs Total # Percentage
Amazon
https://getstoryline.com/public/privacy.html 1,783 9.9%
https://corp.patch.com/privacy 1,012 5.6%
https://cir.st/privacy-policy 410 2.3%
Google
https://xappmedia.com/privacy-policy 32 1.6%
https://voxion.us/google-privacy-policy 24 1.2%
https://www.spokenlayer.com/privacy 20 1.0%
Table 4: The most common duplicate privacy policy URLs.
To understand why there exists such a large number of voice-
apps with duplicate privacy policy URLs especially on Amazon
Alexa platform, we further examined the developer information
of these voice-apps. Our intuition is that developers who pub-
lished multiple voice-apps may use the same privacy policy URLs.
We found that for the developers who developed more than one
skill, 77% of their skills use duplicate privacy policy URLs. Ta-
ble 5 lists the top 5 developers who published the most skills
with a privacy policy on Amazon Alexa platform. As illustrated
in the table, 2,064 out of 2,069 skills (99.8%) use duplicate pri-
vacy policy URLs. Obviously, the content of these privacy pol-
icy URLs are not skill-specific, and users may skip reading the
privacy policy although it is provided. A serious problem hap-
pens if such a privacy policy link is broken, which results in hun-
dreds of skills being affected. For example, we found a broken
link "https://www.freshdigitalgroup.com/privacy-policy-for-bots"
(shown in Table 5). There are 217 skills using this link, and thus all
their privacy policies become inaccessible. As to the Google actions,
we also observed the similar issue. Although Google requires that
a privacy policy must include one of the following: action name,
company name or developer email, there are developers using a
general privacy policy with the company name or email for all their
actions. For the developers who published more than one action,
27.5% of actions have duplicate privacy policy URLs. For the top 10
developers who published the most actions, 86% of their actions
use a duplicate privacy policy link.
Developer # of skillsdeveloped
Skills with
duplicate URLs Top duplicate URLs used by the developer
Patch.com 1,012 1,012 http://corp.patch.com/privacy
Radio.co 295 292 http://www.lottostrategies.com/script/showpage/1001029/b/privacy_policy.html
Tinbu LLC 264 263 http://spokenlayer.com/privacy
FreshDigitalGroup 259 258 https://www.freshdigitalgroup.com/privacy-policy-for-bots
Witlingo 239 239 http://www.witlingo.com/privacy-policy
Table 5: Top 5 developers that published themost skills with
a privacy policy on Amazon Alexa platform.
4.1.4 There are Google and Amazon’s official voice-apps violating
their own requirements. We found two official "Weather" skills on
Amazon Alexa’s skills store, and one of them asks for user’s location
according to the description but it doesn’t provide a privacy policy.
Fig. 5 shows the "Weather" skill developed by Amazon. This skill
may be automatically enabled and available on all Alexa devices
since it is a built-in skill. This example demonstrates that Amazon
Alexa violates its own requirement by publishing voice-apps capa-
ble of collecting personal information without providing a privacy
policy.
Figure 5: An official skill lacks a privacy policy. Even though
it collects the user’s location according to the description, no
privacy policy is provided.
We collected 98 Amazon Alexa official skills (i.e., developed by
Amazon, Amazon Alexa Devs, and Amazon Education Consumer
Team), out of which 59 skills come with privacy policy URLs (but
all are duplicate URLs). Among these privacy policy links, 30 links
point to the general Amazon privacy notice and 6 links are the AWS
(Amazon Web Services) privacy notice, Amazon payment privacy
or Alexa term of use. Surprisingly, 23 privacy policy links are totally
unrelated to privacy notice, in which 17 links are Amazon home-
page and 6 links are pages about insurance. In Google’s actions
store, we found 110 official actions developed by Google, in which
101 actions don’t provide a privacy policy. For the 9 actions with
a privacy policy link, they point to two different Google Privacy
Policy pages and both are general privacy policies. Google requires
that every action should have an app-specific privacy policy pro-
vided by developers on submission. However, our analysis reveals
that this requirement has not been enforced in a proper manner.
4.2 Content analysis of privacy policies
4.2.1 Irrelevance to specific voice-app. It is important to cover
all aspects of a service’s data practices in the privacy policy. The
contradiction is providing these data practices for a service that is
not capable of doing any of the data collections mentioned in the
privacy policy. This is especially evident in the Alexa skill store
where most skills have a privacy policy that is common across all
services that the developers provide. These policies do not clearly
define what data practices the skill is capable of. Some of these
privacy policies do not even mention the Alexa skill or Google
action as a service and state that it is the privacy policy of a specific
service such as the website. We analyzed whether a voice-app
mentions the app name in its privacy policy. There are only 3,233
skills out of 17,952 skills (around 18%) mentioning skills’ names in
their privacy policies. For Google actions, 1,038 out of 1,967 actions
(around 53%) mention action names in the privacy policies.
There were also privacy policies provided for kids skills which
mention that the service is not intended to be used by children and
also that the service can collect some form of personal information,
which is not allowed for skills in kids category according to Amazon
Alexa’s privacy requirements [2]. Fig. 6 shows an example where
the privacy policy URL provided with a kids skill disclosing the
collection of personal data. In addition, we found 137 skills in the
Amazon Alexa’s kids category whose privacy policies mention
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Figure 6: Privacy policy URL provided with a kids skill
"Headspace Bedtime Story" disclosing the collection of per-
sonal data which is prohibited according to Amazon Alexa’s
privacy requirements [2].
data collection is involved. But they just provide a general privacy
policy. All these skills potentially violate Amazon Alexa’s privacy
requirements on kids skills.
4.2.2 Zero data practice. We applied our method described in
Sec. 3.2 to capture data practices in each privacy policy. Fig. 7
illustrates the cumulative distribution function of data practices
we identified using our privacy policy dataset. For these privacy
policies with data practices, the average amount is 24.2 in Amazon
Alexa and 16.6 in Google Assistant, respectively. The maximum
number of data practices in a privacy policy is 428, which is likely
a general privacy policy rather than an app-specific one.
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Figure 7: Number of data practices in a privacy policy.
In particular, 1,117 privacy policies provided with Alexa skills
have zero data practices. Fig. 8 shows the breakdown of different
issues of these privacy policies. 670 URLs lead to totally unrelated
pages which have advertisements and shopping options. 251 URLs
lead to an actual privacy policy page but has no data practices
mentioned. 120 URLs lead to a page where the actual link to the
privacy policy does exist but will be redirected to some other pages.
76 URLs lead to an actual website domain but the link is not found.
These too can be considered as broken links.
Our tool identified 95 Google actions having privacy policies
with zero data practice, as shown in Fig. 8. 37 URLs lead to a page
that is not found. 25 URLs are privacy policies but with no data
practice. 11 URLs lead to unrelated links with shopping options and
product advertisements. 5 URLs lead to a page containing the link
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Figure 8: Different issues of privacy policies that have zero
data practice in two VA platforms.
to the actual privacy policy. In addition, 17 actions provide their
privacy policy as a Google doc which does not have the correct
permissions set which results in users not being able to access it.
This was exclusively found within the Google actions while they
violate Google’s restriction "the link should be a public document
viewable by everyone".
4.2.3 Inconsistency between the privacy policy and description.
Using the method presented in Section 3.3, we identified 50 Alexa
skills that have a privacy policy which is inconsistent with the
corresponding description. These skills describe the collection of
personal data in the description but these data practices are not
mentioned in the privacy policy provided. The consequence of such
occurrences is that the users are not informed about what happens
to their information and who it is shared with. Among the 50 skills,
19 skills ask for address or location; 10 skills request email/ account/
password; name is asked by 7 skills and 4 skills require the birthday;
other skills ask for phone number, contact, gender or health data.
Fig. 9 shows an example, where the skill "Running Outfit Advisor"
mentions collecting the gender information in the description, but
does not mention this data practice in its privacy policy. In another
case, the description of the skill "Record - Journal - Things to Do
Calendar" describes the collection of personal information like the
address of the user. The description has the following line: "Device
Address. Your device address will be used to provide responses with
events local to your area." In the skill’s privacy policy, the data
practices are not disclosed clearly enough but only says "we will
collect personal information by lawful". We treated this kind of
privacy policy as inconsistent (incomplete) privacy policy since
it fails to give a clear idea about its data practices. Table 11 in
Appendix shows the list of these skills with inconsistency between
the privacy policy and description.
4.2.4 Missing required privacy policies. In Sec. 4.1.1, we have
shown 234 Google actions do not have a privacy policy provided,
which violates its own restriction "Google require all actions to
post a link to their privacy policy in the directory". Here we focus
on Amazon Alexa skills and identify cases with missing required
privacy policies.
To collect user’s personal data for use within the voice-apps,
developers can use the built-in feature of collecting the personal
information directly from their Amazon account after taking per-
missions from the user. This permission is taken from the user
when the skill is first enabled. While this is appropriate and respect
7
Figure 9: "Running Outfit Advisor" skill mentions collecting
the gender information in the description, but does notmen-
tion this data practice in its privacy policy.
the users privacy, there is another channel that can be misused for
collecting personal information. A developer can develop a skill to
ask for the personal information from the user through the con-
versational interface. Both Amazon and Google prohibit the use of
conversational interface to collect personal data. But, in the case
of Amazon, this is not strictly enforced in the vetting process. By
collecting personal information in this manner, the developer can
avoid adding a privacy policy URL to the skill’s distribution require-
ments. This is possible because Amazon requires only skills that
publicly declare that they collect personal information to manda-
torily have a privacy policy. The developer can easily bypass this
requirement by lying about not collecting personal information.
Data # of Skills Skills names
Name 10
First Name Analysis, Haircut Scheduler, insurance
service, LOVE CALCULATOR, Mr. Tongue Twister
(Kids), My daily task, Name My Grandkids, Social
Network, Uncle Tony (Kids), who’s right
Location 6 Doctor Locator, Heritage Flag Color, Lapel Athletics,OC Transpo, Weather, World Time
Gender 1 Interactive Bed Time Story (Kids)
Age 1 bright smile
Birthday 1 Cake Walk
Ip Address 1 Network-Assistant
Table 6: Skills with no privacy policies despite mentioning
the collection of users data in their descriptions.
Fig. 10 in Appendix illustrates an example where the skill "Name
My Grandkids" includes in its description that it asks the users for
personal information and stores it for future use. In another case,
the skill "Lapel Athletics" requires the device location according to
its description. But both these skills do not provide a privacy policy.
Table 6 lists skills which are supposed to have a privacy policy but
do not provide one.
4.2.5 Cross-platform inconsistency. For a few voice-apps that
are present on both Alexa and Google platforms, we found that
the privacy policies provided with each are not the same. Com-
paring Google actions and Alexa skills, we found that 23 voice-
apps which are present on both the platforms have differences in
the privacy policy links provided despite the name, the descrip-
tions and the developer name being the same. 13 of these pairs
have different privacy policies links all together. For example, the
skill "Did Thanos Kill Me" uses a duplicate privacy policy link
"https://getstoryline.com/public/privacy.html" (shown in Table 4),
but the corresponding Google action version provides a specific pri-
vacy policy. Since Google requires every action to provide a privacy
policy link, developers provide one with the Google action but may
choose to not provide one along with the Alexa skill since the Alexa
platform doesn’t have this requirement. We found 10 such pairs
of skills. Table 7 shows the list of these skills with cross-platform
inconsistency.
Issue Skill name
Different privacy
policies provided in
a skill & action pair
VB Connect, Orbit B-Hyve, Freeze Dancers,
Burbank Town Center, New York Daily News,
uHoo, RadioMv, MyHealthyDay, Real Simple Tips,
Did Thanos Kill Me, Central Mall Lawton, Creative
Director, The Hartford Small Business Insurance
A skill doesn’t have
a privacy policy
while the Google
action version has
one
Triple M NRL, Collective Noun, Sleep by Nature
Made, Coin Control, Those Two Girls, Radio
Chaser, A Precious Day, Running facts, Ash
London Live, Weekend Breakfast
Table 7: Same voice-apps with different privacy policies on
two VA platforms.
4.2.6 Potential noncompliance with legal regulations. We ob-
served skills that collect personal information being published on
the Amazon Alexa skills store under the kids category without
providing a privacy policy. For example, Table 6 lists 3 skills (which
are marked with "Kids" in the table) in the kids category lacking a
privacy policy. This is not compliant with the COPPA regulations
which require every developer collecting personal information from
children to follow certain rules. Providing a privacy policy with
accurate information about the data being collected and what it is
used for is one of the main requirements. The objective is to clearly
let the parents know about what personal information can be col-
lected by the skill from their children. Health related information
can also be collected by a skill through the conversational interface
without providing a privacy policy even though only the user can
decide whether to provide it or not. But still having the capability to
do so might be a violation of the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act) regulation. CalOPPA (California Online
Privacy Protection Act) requires developers to provide a privacy
policy that states exactly what data can be collected from users. In
Sec. 4.2.1, we found that 137 kids skills provide general information
without providing specifics on what personal data they actually
collect. These voice-apps and their privacy policies may not be in
compliance with legal regulations.
4.3 Usability issues
4.3.1 Lengthy privacy policies. One of the main problems asso-
ciated with privacy policies regardless of the type of service it is
provided with is the length of the privacy policy document. Most
developers write long policies that decreases the interest that a user
has in reading it. From the analysis of the privacy policies in our
datasets, as shown in Fig. 2, we observed that 58% of the privacy
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policies have more than 1,500 words. Being a legal document, it
takes an average of 12 mins to read 1,500 words. This makes the
privacy policy hard to read for the users and almost impossible
to be read out through voice. The privacy policies of Google and
Amazon themselves are more than 4,300 words each. The average
number of words in a privacy policy provided along with Alexa
skills is 2,336 and that of Google actions is 1,479. This results in
users frequently skipping reading the privacy policy even if it is
provided. The participants of the user study we conducted as shown
in Sec. 8 complained about the length of the privacy policy being
the major reason for them not reading the privacy policy.
4.3.2 Hard to access. The constrained interfaces on VA devices
pose challenges on effective privacy notices. According to the cur-
rent architecture of Amazon Alexa and the Google Assistant, the
privacy policy is not available directly through VA devices used
at home like the Amazon Echo and the Google Home. No prompt
is delivered either during any part of the users interaction with
the voice-app that requests the user to take a look at the privacy
policy. If at all the user wants to view the privacy policy, he/she has
to either find the voice-app listing on the store webpage or check
the companion app using smartphones, and find a voice-app’s pri-
vacy policy URL provided in the listing. The permissions set by
the developer to collect personal information from users is shown
as a prompt in the smartphone companion app to the user while
enabling the voice-app. But as mentioned in the Sec. 4.2.4, develop-
ers do not necessarily have to take permission from user and can
instead collect it during the conversation. We discuss solutions to
improve the usability of privacy notice for voice-apps in Sec. 6.3.
5 USER STUDY
We conducted an online user study using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk crowdsourcing platform [4], and our study has received an IRB
approval. Different from prior user studies that focus on understand-
ing security and privacy concerns of VA devices [15, 25, 31, 37, 43],
we aimed to understand how users engage with privacy policies
and their perspectives on them. We looked for the frequency of
checking the privacy policies and any issues the users might have
encountered with it. Our participants were MTurk workers who
reside in USA, having a HIT (Human Intelligence Tasks) acceptance
rate greater than 98 and have at least 500 HITs approved prior to
this study. These filters were added to reduce the amount of junk
data that we may have collected. All participants were initially pre-
sented with a consent form approved by the IRB office. Participants
who did not consent to the form were denied to proceed with the
study. We rewarded $0.2 to each participant who completed the
study.
We had a total of 98 participants who took part in our study. We
had included a question to ensure that the user is answering the
survey authentically. Based on the responses to this question, we
rejected the answers of 7 participants. Our results for the user study
were thus based on responses from 91 users. The participants are
either Amazon Alexa users or Google Assistant users. We didn’t
include participants who use other assistants like Siri and Cortana
in our study. We had 66 participants who are Alexa users and 25
participants who use Google assistant at home.
Question Response % of users
Yes 48Are you aware of the privacy policies of your skills/actions? No 52
Rarely 73
Half the time 11How often do you read the privacy policy of a skill/action?
Most of the time 16
No 66Do you read the privacy policy from the skill/action’s
webpage/Alexa app? Yes 34
No 47
Maybe 21Do you know what personal data the skills/actionsyou use are capable of collecting from you? Yes 32
No 79
Maybe 7Do you read the privacy policy before using a newskill / action? Yes 14
No 75
Maybe 7Do you read the privacy policy before enabling akid’s skill / action? Yes 18
Table 8: Survey responses.
Table 8 shows the survey responses. When asked about whether
they are aware of the privacy policies of the voice-apps they use,
about 48% of the participants claimed that they are aware of it.
But when asked about how often they actually read the privacy
policy provided by the developer, 73% responded with "rarely". 11%
responded that they read it half the time. 34% of our participants
said that they use the smartphone app or the skills webpage to read
the privacy policy while the rest 66% said that they never read it.
47% were not aware of what data is being collected by the skill from
them and another 21% were not entirely sure either. This shows a
major usability issue where the users ignore the privacy policy even
when it is provided by the developer. When asked about the issues
they face with privacy policies, 20% of the participants responded by
saying it is hard to access. 44% of participants felt that the document
was too long. 24% claimed that they felt inconsistencies between the
privacy policy and the skill’s actual functionality and description.
Users also had problem with developers not providing a privacy
policy at all and the ones provided being not informative. The
document being too legal and hard to comprehend was a concern
for the users. Only 14% of participants felt that they always check
the privacy policy before enabling a skill. 79% of our participants
did not check the privacy policy before enabling a general skill and
75% did not check it before enabling a kids skill. This lack of usage of
the privacy policy by the users shows the need of the voice assistant
platforms to address the concerns and take measures to improve
the quality as well as the usability of the privacy policies provided
by the developers. We have included a few responses from the
participants about their perspectives on whether privacy policies
should be required for every voice-app in Table 12 in Appendix.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the limitation of this work and further re-
search that can help in addressing the user frustration over privacy
policies in VA platforms.
6.1 Limitation
We are unable to examine the actual source code of voice-apps. The
availability of the source code can largely increase the knowledge
of what personal data the voice-app is able to collect and where it
is stored. This can be compared with the privacy policy to ensure
the developer is not performing any malicious activity or misus-
ing the user’s trust. With having no baseline, a future research
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effort that can be done on this regard is to dynamically test voice-
apps by enabling them and check their data collection practices.
Most developers provide short descriptions which will introduce
the skill/action to end users, but data practices are not frequently
defined in the descriptions. Since the data related to voice-apps
is very limited, we largely depend on the descriptions provided
with the voice-apps. This makes our findings on the inconsistency
checking not complete. As mentioned in Sec. 3.2, our focus is on
revealing the existence of problematic privacy policies, rather than
identifying all the inconsistent privacy policies. For capturing data
practices, we use a keyword-based method, and compare the simi-
larity of a privacy policy with our keyword dictionary. However,
the keyword set can be incomplete. In our future work, we plan to
use machine learning techniques to train a model to identify data
practices from natural language documents. Nevertheless, we have
collected strong evidence in revealing issues over privacy policies
on VA platforms. In addition, the dataset of Google actions that
we collected and used for our study is not complete and does not
contain all the voice-apps available in the app store. The actions
are listed in pages that automatically load more data when the user
reaches the end of the page. Since more and more actions keep
getting loaded dynamically, we were unable to use the crawler to
automatically get information about all the actions.
6.2 Why poor-quality privacy policies?
Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant not explicitly requiring app-
specific privacy policies results in developers providing the same
document that explains data practices of all their services. This
leads to uncertainties and confusion among end users. There are
skills with privacy policies containing up to 428 data practices and
most of these data practices are not relevant to the skill. Thus these
documents do not give a proper understanding of the capabilities of
the skill to end users. The poor quality of privacy policies provided
with voice-apps is partially due to the lack of an app-specific pri-
vacy policy and due to the lenient certification system. During the
certification process, the content of a privacy policy is not checked
thoroughly when the skill is submitted for certification, which has
resulted in a large amount of inactive and broken links and also pri-
vacy policies not related to the skill. Some privacy policies mention
data practices that are in violation of the privacy requirements that
Amazon and Google have set but these voice-apps are still certified.
In some cases, even if the developer writes the privacy policy
with proper intention and care, there can be some discrepancies
between the policy and the actual code. Updates made to the skill
might not be reflected in the privacy policy. This is especially pos-
sible with the current VA architecture because the backend code of
the skill can be updated at any time by the developer and does not
require any re-certification to be made available to the end users.
The outdated policy may lead to the developers unintentionally
collecting personal information without informing the users.
6.3 Privacy policy through voice
The unavailability of privacy policies through voice requires users
to access them over the web or through the apps on their phones.
One possible reason for this can be due to the large size of the
privacy policies and the time required to read out the long docu-
ment. Users who only use voice assistant services through their
VA devices, may not necessarily be aware of the existence of the
privacy policies in the respective stores. Also, it is completely left to
the user to decide whether to view the privacy policy or not. There
is no approval asked prior to enabling the voice-app for the user.
In order to address these issues, we propose to introduce a built-in
intent (i.e., functionality) for a voice-app that gives information to
users about the privacy policy of the voice-app through a voice
response. The major challenge for this is that the privacy policies
are usually too long to be read out to users. Thus, the response
provided by the built-in intent has to be marginally short.
Prior work has been done to summarize the privacy policies to
make it more readable to the user. Tools like Polisis [27] and Priva-
cycheck [11] conduct privacy policy analysis and represent the data
practices mentioned in the document in a simpler form to users.
But from our analysis of the skills/actions available in the stores,
we have noticed that most privacy policies are general policies and
do not necessarily define what the behavior of the voice-app in
particular is. Since personal information can be collected through
the conversational interface, our approach aims in understanding
this capability from the voice-app’s source code, automatically gen-
erating an easy-to-digest privacy notice, and letting the user know
about it through the voice channel. To achieve this, we describe
our preliminary approach based on the Alexa platform. We take
the interaction model of a skill, which is a JSON (JavaScript Object
Notation) file and scan for all the slots and their slot types specified.
We categorise the built-in slot types based on what type of personal
information they can collect. For custom slot types, we compare
the values provided with the entries in datasets we assembled of
possible values and check for a match. After we get all the types of
information that can be collected by the skill, we create a response
notifying the user that the skill has these capabilities and advise
users to look at the detailed privacy policy provided by the devel-
opers. The intent can be invoked when the skill is first enabled. On
opening the skill for the first time, this brief privacy notice can be
read out to the user. This will give the user a better understanding
of what the skill he/she just enabled is capable of collecting and
using. The users can also ask to invoke this intent later to get a
brief version of the privacy policy. As our future work, we plan
to extend this approach to help developers automatically generate
privacy policies for their voice-apps.
7 RELATEDWORK
7.1 Privacy concerns for voice assistants
Many research efforts have been undertaken to study user concerns
(human factors) about the security/privacy of VA devices [15, 16, 19,
23, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, 43]. Fruchter et al. [25] used natural language
processing to identify privacy and security related reviews about VA
devices from four major online retailers: Target, Walmart, Amazon,
and Best Buy. The authors highlighted that users worried about
the lack of clarity about the scope of data collection by their voice
assistants. Through a semi-structured interviews with 17 VA users,
Abdi et al. [15] uncovered the lack of trust users have with some of
VA use cases such as shopping, and a very limited conception of VA
ecosystem and related data activities. Malkin et al. [31] surveyed 116
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VA owners and found that half did not know that their recordings
were being stored by the device manufacturers. Similarly, authors
in [43, 46] conducted interviews on smart home owners to examine
user mental models and understand their privacy perceptions of
IoT devices. Geeng et al. [26] investigated tensions and challenges
that arise among multiple users in smart home environment. Lau et
al. [29] conducted interviews with both VA users and non-users,
and revealed that privacy concerns could be the main deterring
factor for new users.
There has been an increasing amount of research on techni-
cal attack vectors against VA systems and the corresponding de-
fenses. One line of research is to exploit interpretation errors of
user commands by speech recognition, such as voice squatting at-
tack [28, 45], and generate hidden/inaudible voice commands [21,
33, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44]. Another line of research focuses on defense
mechanisms, including, continuous authentication [24], canceling
unwanted baseband signals [44], correlating magnetic changes with
voice commands [22], and user presence-based access control [30].
Our work differs from these previous work in that we investigate
the effectiveness of privacy policies provided by voice-app develop-
ers.
7.2 Privacy policy analysis for mobile apps
Privacy policies disclose an organization’s or developer’s data prac-
tices. Though researchers have conducted privacy policy analysis
on Android platform [17, 36, 39, 41, 47, 48], there is an absence of pri-
vacy policy analysis on VA platforms. Zimmeck et al. [48] presented
a privacy analysis system for Android to analyze apps’ potential
non-compliance with privacy requirements, and inconsistencies
between privacy policies and apps. Results show that 71% of apps
that lack a privacy policy should have one, and a substantial por-
tion of apps exhibit potential privacy requirement inconsistencies.
Wang et al. [39] developed a hierarchical mapping based approach
for privacy policy analysis which is able to handle the data inputted
by users in addition to the data accessed directly through the mobile
device. The user input data is checked for possible privacy leaks
and this is used to determine whether the app’s privacy policy is in
contradiction with this leakage. The consistency between the data
collected by the app and the privacy policy provided is verified by
using a data flow analysis. A major difference of our work from
these works is that we rely on voice-app’s description to detect
inconsistency in privacy policies due to the unavailability of voice-
app’s source code. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to systematically measure the effectiveness of privacy policies
for voice-apps.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted a comprehensive empirical analysis on
privacy policy of 64,720 Amazon Alexa skills and 2,201 Google As-
sistant actions. We designed an NLP-based approach to capture data
practices in privacy policies and descriptions of voice-apps. Our
results showed that a substantial number of problematic privacy
policies exist in Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant platforms, a
worrisome reality of privacy policies on VA platforms. Google and
Amazon even have official voice-apps violating their own require-
ments regarding the privacy policy. We also conducted a user study
to understand users’ perspectives on voice-apps’ privacy policies,
which reflects real-world user frustrations on this issue. We also
discussed possible approaches to improve the usability of privacy
policies on VA platforms.
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Appendices
Category Skills wecrawled
Skills with a
privacy policy
Business & Finance 3,599 1,420
Connected Car 140 100
Education & Reference 7,990 1,460
Food & Drink 1,379 407
Games & Trivia 11,822 1,461
Health & Fitness 2,026 844
Kids 3,252 461
Lifestyle 11,080 2,693
Local 1,283 377
Movies & TV 915 153
Music & Audio 9,216 3,155
News 6,810 2,907
Novelty& Humor 3,418 394
Productivity 4,263 1,434
Shopping 342 204
Smart Home 2,432 2,254
Social 1,479 531
Sports 1,592 343
Travel & Transportation 1,187 205
Utilities 1,025 191
Weather 853 150
Total skills 76,103 21,144
Total unique skills 64,720 17,952
Table 9: Alexa skills by category in our dataset. Some skills
are classified and listed in multiple categories. After remov-
ing the cross-listed duplicates, we obtained 64,720 unique
skills, and 17,952 of these skills provide privacy policy links.
Category Actions wecrawled
Actions with a
privacy policy
Arts & Lifestyle 96 85
Business & Finance 159 156
Communication & Social 27 11
Education & Reference 153 145
Food & Drink 152 142
Games & Fun 174 167
Health & Fitness 122 119
Kids & Family 102 101
Local 65 61
Movies, Photos & TV 52 44
Music & Audio 132 121
News & Magazines 176 80
Productivity 52 41
Shopping 89 86
Smart Home 290 274
Sports 161 142
Travel & Transportation 142 136
Weather 57 56
Total actions 2,201 1,967
Table 10: Google actions by category in our dataset.
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Arbonne My Office, Arm My Guardzilla, Ash Timber Flooring,
Atrium Health, Best Roomies, Cake Walk, Call Handler, CitySpark
Events, Conway Daily Sun Calendar, Crush Calculator, Find My
Phone, Flu Season, FortiRecorder, garage control, GINA Talk,
group messenger, Hal9000, Happy birthday, Home Workout
Exercise Video Fitness 7 Day Videos, hugOne, ISS: Distance From
Me?, K5, Kamakshi Cloud’s GPS Finder, Kotipizza, Laconia Daily
Sun Calendar, Mailbox Assistant, Maui Time Calendar, My Air
Quality, My Extra Brain, My Two Cents, Natural Hazards,
Neighbor Knocker, Novant Health, OMS Customer Care, Portland
Phoenix Calendar, Prayer Time, Record-Journal - Things to Do
Calendar, Running Clothes, Running Outfit Advisor, SkyHome,
SkyView Academy, The Transit Oracle (Bus Predictions for SF
Muni), Thought Leaders, Ticket Finder, Trip Tracker, Trivia Quest,
walk cake, What Should I Wear, what’s nearby, WP6
Table 11: Amazon Alexa skills with inconsistency between
the privacy policy and description.
Figure 10: Although the skill description mentions collec-
tion of personal information, no privacy policy is provided.
Question Do you think all skills should have a privacy policy?
Responses
A privacy policy is always necessary to give users a piece of mind.
Users should be able to know the risks involved such as if others could
be listening in illegally.
Privacy policy is definitely required so it can assure consumers that it
is unlikely that malicious actions will occur with their data.
They should be made easily accessible too.
Required if in fact there are things that customers should be warned
about prior to using it.
A privacy policy would be completely necessary. I feel like the skills
need to disclose everything being done with a user’s data.
But it should be easily explained and controls easily learned.
If data is being collected, this is personal information that the user
should have some control over.
It needs to be more digestible so people will actually read it.
I do think it is necessary to have a privacy policy, but I do think it
should be short and easy to understand.
Table 12: User’s view on the necessity of privacy policies.We
present a few selected responses received from the partici-
pants in our user study when asked the question "Do you
think all skills should have a privacy policy?"
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